

THE NON MODERN CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSITY.

Willy Thayer.

Conferencia dada en la Universidad del Estado de New York (Binghamton) en abril del 2003.

The context as university.

To open a dialogue on the university demands, first, that one weigh the site in which the university takes place. Especially nowadays, when place and context seem to have no limits. They contaminate it all, and preclude every independent operation. Because of this, the question of whether the university enjoys, or whether it is possible for it at present to enjoy, autonomy, inwardness, self possession, authorship and responsibility regarding the missions, duties and historical performances which it would be allotted —which it would have been allotted in modernity— and to which, in conformity with its modern verisimilitude, it binds itself. This question, as to whether the university is or can ever constitute itself as a subject, or whether it has ever constituted itself as such. Or whether it sets up a conflict, distancing itself from context, and in what sense. Or whether it is still possible for it to maintain that difference, out of which the university formerly erected itself -as the walls and barriers with which the university campus has regularly surrounded itself seem to demonstrate-, presenting itself as another space, autonomous with regard to the political public present, where it would historically intervene as *deus ex machina*, etc. Questions such as these seem to be the ones that ought to be tackled and considered first.

Can the university then be considered a subject? The subject of modern knowledge in its two main occupations, the “fundamental (speculative) inquiry” (negative dialectics) and the “instrumental investigation” or the professional application of knowledge? The subject of the division of labour, of the conflict, of the class struggle, so to speak, between truth and knowledge? Is it still a supervising principle, the guardian, regulator and guarantor of knowledge in the different fields and practices? Is the university responsible for the instrumentalisation of knowledge, as well as of its reverberation (catexis) in the different areas of practical activity? Is it the highest centre of responsibility to which one should appeal so as to account for the universalisation of the enlightened lifestyle? Is it responsible for

the gradual global modernisation of the entire scale *naive* condition? , For the ready to hand and the functioning of objects and their environmental outflows? Is the university responsible for the demarcation, hierarchy an authority of the linguistic market? For the regionalisation of knowledge and its censorship canons, for generic taxonomies, as well as for behaviour, competence and pertinence in each specific case? Or is now everything in it heteronomy, setting and exteriority, so that its name is, undifferentiatedly laid out in the directory of institutions which give shape to the *menu* of the present, in spite of those limits and barriers, by means of which the university continues to feign independence, indisposition and autarchy, in relation to what surrounds it?

Because it is also possible that the university is nothing but a ramp, a mere intersection of procedures of knowledge and of power which pass through it —not necessarily through its core—; procedures which, not necessarily coming from a recognisable and localisable centre, regulate and stabilise the university, and not the other way round, as one would in modernity. The university, in this case is merely a station among others in the distended processing of the information market, of the technical division of knowledge and practices.

The university as context

But also, what happens with the context if we imagine it from inside the university? To what extent has the university constructed the context, realising itself as a “university city”, in which performances, gestures, pre-university loose zones have been despotically absorbed into higher protocols and habits? The university in all its linguistic-disciplinary variety and mobility, massively internalised from pre-school onward, exercises its panoptism over objects and subjects with greater exhaustiveness and automatism than ever. Every professional, according to the intensity with which he has absorbed and let himself be absorbed by his speciality, not only watches over the objects that fall under his professional region, but also watches over himself and the zones of desire that dislocate him in relation to his professional performance and efficiency. In the university determined society we “exude” (Nietzsche) university. All of the objects that surround us —objects produced and manipulated by the professions— behave universitarily. At least, that is what we demand of them: specificity, efficiency and performance and reproducibility within the series.. .Publicity itself advertises these objects by exacerbating the performance and normality which is assigned to them by the historical *episteme* that shelters them. Such a device is, in each case, constructed, and regulated by the professional faculties.

We acquire university manners and a university mechanism of perception not only thanks to our direct educational system. It is not necessary to go through a specific curriculum in order to be formatted by the university's universality. Continuous mass-media bombardment is enough for our ideas and our behaviour to be formatted by the university codes —ideas and behaviour whose repetition strengthens or depresses the efficiency/inefficiency, normality/abnormality of our body-language—; so that we are ritualised by needs and disguises “we ourselves” seem not to have generated. In pre-school the university code conditions our sphincter to make it correspond to the stimuli that no longer unfold in the immediately academic format, but in the mediated matrix of the screen; in the speed of electric publicity and in its trans-cultural *menu*. There is not an inch within publicity which is not formatted and decided by the university. Even the faults and lapses of the publicist or director, or the shortcircuiting of the power system, is inscribed into the habits and professional net of the university. There is no possible suspension (epokhé) of the university which does not belong to the university. And it is the same with the strategic mercantile and military production of knowledge which unfolds in non university centres, insofar as such production corresponds to the university's universal method.

To what extent, then, is the university, from this perspective, more than ever, the principle of subjection that produces and is produced as context? To what degree has the university —has its style— imperially expanded beyond its own boundaries, “greedily and totalitarially errasing” (Nietzsche) the non-university reality that opposes it. To what extent has the university realised its extension, by knocking down the walls, the distance, the limit, the difference between an inside and an outside?

And if this were so, what kind of an empire, would the university constitute? Perhaps a totality that no longer requires sites and cloisters or an inside because everything outside it is already its decentred cloister? An electric one, for example (McLuhan), or a telematic one (Derrida)? Or can one still think of and desire a university that knows itself, its own operations; a university that still maintains , a distance from which it thinks of what is laid out in the game of the present; a university that still preserves the division of labour, the “conflict of the faculties” between professional “physical labour” (*fusis*) and “intellectual labour” (*meta-fusis*), between knowledge and truth?

The idea of the university as a historic-productive nucleus which watches over knowledge and society, today would be exceeded by the actual operations of

knowledge. The prejudgement of a university guidance system, and the collision of that preconception with a reality that doesn't coincide with it, would rest on the modern belief that the university is the source of science, technology, professions and secularised ethics as professional *performance*.

And indeed, if we take that presupposition for granted from the outset, i.e.: that science, knowledge and work, are the offspring of the university, we will easily agree that it is the university's role to evaluate not only what is or is not knowledge, but also to control professional society in its multiple vicissitudes via the specialities it imparts, the perceptions it provokes and by means of which it stretches out, throughout the schemes of everyday life. Because, whether they want to or not, professionals automatically guard the portion of objects that their profession and their humanity affords them; and generally, the discussion regarding objects is ultimately circumscribed, inasmuch as it is considered *serious* discussion, to the university's codes, and protocols.

The university as centre

The idea of the university as a national- centre of control and guidance of research and teaching, is perhaps in the process of vanishing. What for Kant were the exterior margins of the university (academies, specialised societies), whose knowledge did not threaten or compete with it, today have become perhaps the centre of relevant knowledge. And yet, in many cases, it is a knowledge which cannot be taught, published or administered by the university. Such margins – which in the eighteenth century did not threaten the university, today threaten it to such an extent that they depict it as a margin, as propedeutic, subordinate and parasitic knowledge. The fact that there exist powerful regions of knowledge not susceptible to university evaluation, should be enough to threaten the architecture of the modern university as a centre. That the present reality of the university does not agree with the idea of the university as a centre of knowledge becomes evident in the question of the exterior sites: the centres which grow beyond the margins of the university's administration, centres which the university not only does not control, but lacks the right to control. The university often even lacks the commercial possibilities of gaining access to the knowledge and information that is produced and administered by these centres.

The growth and the sort of technical-scientific competence that the strategic-mercantile enclaves of research possess, would seem to have outstripped the university. The university has been left behind by the knowledge that these

enclaves generate; it has been appointed as an institution for the mass reproduction of knowledge that has been devaluated in its mercantile, geo-political secret. The telematic commercialisation of knowledge gradually renders the idea of a centralised state-university knowledge with educational-spiritual aims (Humboldt) or educational-technical aims (Descartes-Comte) useless. The relation between the suppliers and users of knowledge tends to adopt a similar form to the one established between commodity producers and consumers. Knowledge has slowly lost its “use value”. And instead of being transmitted by the university to civil society for the “spiritual and moral education of the nation”, it is gradually abstracted as pure exchange value in the expanded processes of circulation.

The fact that there are important regions of knowledge that are not liable to university evaluation and control; that the university doesn't have access to relevant knowledge in its own right, not even under the buying and selling protocol; that it doesn't, in general, decide about what can be taught and studied, indicates that its seat of honour as a centre of knowledge is (always has been?) an illusion of the modern philosophical discourse about the university. We insist, nevertheless on asking: what would be the difference between such centres and the university if such centres are already pertain to the university performance?

The university's organic unity and reunion principle

For a long time, the university thought of itself as the totality of fields of knowledge and teachings gathered together under a single principle, a single narrative, a single tradition or history, in the vicissitudes of its geographic-linguistic displacements and annexations, and in the outline of its revolutions.

Although since the XII century *universitas* administratively means the reunion of people who belong to a same guild, the utopia of a complete encyclopaedia of knowledge was something desirable. It constituted one of the teleological principles of the university. The university thought of itself, from the very beginning, as a totalitarian system that was to institute as knowledge or non-knowledge a variety of practices, products, codes and methods, according to a general criteria. A variety of activities had to be hierarchically organised by the university, placed inside and outside, above and below the scholastic institution .

Thus, the university has appeared as a live and malleable machine that digests, and expels, that locates and dislocates knowledges and tasks which are dispersed in different traditions; knowledges and tasks which before the university's

consideration and verdict, wonder as ‘barbarians’ and ‘pagans’ around languages and territories, with no public or universal hierarchy, yielding only to their own strength.

The university would have brought together; languages and experiences which are irreducible to each other, which lack a common tradition and a common history. It would have assimilated them, turning them into a same tradition of knowledge.

The university logic, the public presence of its knowledge and its tasks would be the result of a levelling of dissimilar activities and experiences. In many cases, these activities have been persecuted and condemned by the university. Consider the condemnation, and the “fear” of the medieval university facing the irreducible events signed by Bruno, Galileo and Descartes. Irreducible events whose strangeness, from the moment they first appeared, threatened and disgusted the university subjectivity of the time. Phenomena which after a time become the head of the university itself, the subjectivity, the law, the new universality of the university regime.

Kant: the philosophy faculty as reunion principle

It was Kant who clearly thought about the need to establish the exterior para-university process of production and reflection as the university’s centre itself, and as the principle of its autonomy. Thus, by erecting the “anarchy” of the “Inferior Faculty —or Philosophy— as the “Superior Faculty”, Kant situated the reflexive “outside” of the university, its eventful zone, as a nuclear interior. He placed the wall that separated the outside from the inside of the university in its centre, as its essential conflict. The university then became the conflict of the faculties, and remained thus until the crisis of the modern university in May 68 in France.

From Kant onwards, the university as reunion imperative could only be realised from inside the Philosophy Faculty, an inside that does not subordinate itself to any established law or canon, but rather reflexively dislocates itself from them, inquiring about their truth and about the conditions of all instituted knowledge.

The collapse of the university’s unity

It is important to refer to the contemporary state of affairs regarding the relation between the primary unity which is condensed in the name “uni-versity”, the

diversity of knowledges that it would, supposedly, systematise, and the modality of that reunion. What would be collapsing today is not only the organic unity of knowledge —a unity Husserl tried to restore. (E. Husserl, 1984) What would be collapsing, above all, is the question about unity, principle or foundation itself. The order of knowledge today would be essentially disperse. And “disperse” would not mean that the different specialities have no contact with each other, that they are closed in on themselves like atoms without any doors or windows, lacking any pre-established harmony which guaranties their communicability. “Disperse” would mean that the university’s ideal of a systematic unity of different kinds of knowledge under a single principle is not accomplished any longer; nor is there a reflexive principle which interrogatively encompasses all the disciplines without enclosing itself in any of them, thus establishing itself as the “knowledge of knowledge” or the truth of knowledge. The unity of the university can no longer be thought of as “knowledge of knowledge”. A single meta-knowledge, which, liberated from the contingency of knowledge, could unite and guide the university in the midst of the events in which it is immersed; a meta-knowledge that would, in passing, give it autonomy in the midst of contingency, would not be possible. The impossibility of thinking about itself and its context, from a thought that has not fallen into the exchange of knowledges —an impossibility that leaves her to drift in the tide of events— would mark the university’s crisis. “If the modern university is defined by its capacity to reflect upon the unitary bases and conditions of the diversity it contains, we would have to conclude that the contemporary situation of the university is sealed by the growing impossibility of this kind of reflection. That would be the same as talking about the end of the university.” (Oyarzún, 1992).

From epic to kitsch; from enthusiasm to boredom.

There was a time when the name “university” attracted enthusiasm and epic: the learned man as hero and priest of history. And the grandness of what was conjugated under that name, made it worthy of such an exclusive recognition: autonomy regarding the state and regarding society; archive and centre of universal knowledge; education and construction of the spirit of the people; qualification of the working forces; “knowledge of knowledge” or question about the truth of science; so continues the manifold volley regarding the university’s “mission”, the missionary university, therefore.

Although the winds that blow today regarding knowledge, the state, the people, nature, history, are not contrary to the “university industry” (Kant) nor to the expanded circulation of knowledge in the market, nor to the professionalisation

imperative, they have moderated the epic splendour that the role of the hero, conductor of nations and of humanity as a whole, conferred on it.

All the emblems of its epic now constitute its *kitsch*. And it could not be otherwise in a context where what was heroic about science and creation has been gradually replaced by the operational immanence of curricular diets of appropriation by quotas of professional intelligence, by the accreditation curriculums which can be visited as liberally as a supermarket. The humanist and progressive emblems of the modern university have no other function than to adorn and clothe the public-marketing relations of the university. Such emblems, in any case, neither govern the sense nor the course, nor the administration of university life. On the contrary, it is university administration which marks out and operates the effect and scope of its significance.

The academic, humanitarian and progressive values which today are ascribed to the post-dictatorship university shape the university market's kitsch (Andres Bello, Gabriela Mistral, Santo Tomas, Blas Cañas, Bernardo O'higgins, San Estanislao de Koska (SEK), Pedro de Valdivia, Miguel de Cervantes, la Republica, Universidad of Chile, national university, ,solidarity university, university of the present and of the future.). Promoting the high values, signatures and sphinxes of tradition, the marketing syntax turns such values into exchange values. What does the *Consejo Superior de Educación* evaluate? What value does it control? Is it its job to control academic "quality" in the context of exchange value in which the 1981 imposed university law placed higher education? What does "academic quality" mean in the linguistic market? What value is promoted today in posters, rectoral or ministerial discourses on education, under the rubric of "academic excellence"? Is it possible for academic quality to constitute a value irreducible to the market?

We no longer inhabit the university in the promise of such values and emblems.

If life and scientific, political, artistic tasks were conducted, in modernity, by narratives with a transcendental meaning, philosophies of the subject's emancipation in the process of production and invention of his life; in the actual context of globalisation we would be experiencing the process of dissolution of such philosophies of history, which used to ensure us distance and autonomy with regard to efficiency. The following could be a possible translation for the term "globalisation": practices which increasingly become more efficient, which have no philosophy of history. Any practice that is guided not only by the immediate efficiency of its method, but that ultimately orients itself in relation to the hyperbolic discussion of its conditions could be called modern in opposition to

globalised. The southern cone dictatorships constituted the transition from an ideological and reflexive modernity, to a present with no ideologies and no critical hyperbole. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that in the limitless horizon of globalisation, ideologies have proliferated more than ever before. Globalisation would gradually be more pluralist, more tolerant and democratic regarding ideology and criticism. However, the idea that any ideology must be allowed into the menu of democracy, would be one of the clearest symptoms of the death or decline of the ideological in the context of modernity. The weakening of the ideological would be related to its proliferation. How would this happen?

The ruin of the ideological as the orientating principle of practice, would make the proliferation of ideologies possible. Insofar as no particular ideology can conduct or aspire to conduct or be desired as conductor, it would seem easy for all of them to stand next to one another as in a pluralist fancy-dress or emblem party. Ideological tension, conflict, confrontation and censorship would arise from a context where ideological reflexivity is believed to conduct history, the State and education. It is ideology, ideological dispute and confrontation that in modernity regulates events. Globalisation, on the other hand, would perceive any ideological conduction of the educational process as the tyranny of ideology over contingency (the market) –a restraint it is absolutely necessary to be freed of at the risk of losing fluidity. Modernisation would be the context where the ideological proliferates, but no longer as its commanding function, but rather, as variety, as the menu of supply and demand, as a marketing skill. The ideological is defeated in its semantic density but instantly recovered in its syntactic levity.

Facts govern. The crisis of modernity is related to the defeat of ideology by facts. But in modernity facts also triumphed over ideologies. One could even maintain that facts have always surpassed meaning. In modernity, however, it was possible to overcome the irruption of facts and the rule of their logic. This ideological-discursive overcoming of events would be characteristic of modernity -which could be thus defined.

Specific of globalisation would be the impossibility of discursively and critically overcoming events. For it is not merely a question of the destruction of one or another ideology by facts, but rather of the devastation of the possibility of ideology as such. It would not be possible or desirable to recover ideologically from what takes place. It would no longer be possible to erect oneself as the principle of meaning of what occurs. And if what occurs globally today is called “advanced capitalism”, “post-industrial society” or “integrated world capitalism”, this capitalism would no longer be an ideology. What is characteristic about

capitalism, in contemporary society, is its capacity to operate technically without reflexivity, that is, technologically. Present-day capitalism would reveal that all ideology —including socialism— would have served as a means to its post-ideological consolidation. Democracy would not be essential to globalised capitalism, as Fukuyama holds. It develops under various kinds of dictatorships and regimes. (Guattari).

The representation crisis of the university

If we accept the hypothesis that it is in Kant's *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) — and in the series of German philosophical writings that were produced for and in the proximity of the creation of the Berlin University, in 1810)— where the system of categories, limits and relations that constitute the “transcendental architectonics” (Kant) of the modern university, in discussion with the system of limits of the medieval university; if we rely on this hypothesis, we have to consider that when one talks about the crisis of the modern university, one is talking about the total or partial inapplicability of the Kantian table of categories. One is, therefore, talking about a displacement of the empirical university outside the boundaries of modern categorisation; not only outside the boundaries of modern categorisation, but of any order of categorisation.

The modern categories for representing and reflecting on what universitarily takes place, would have become outmoded. When one talks about the crisis of modern education, one is talking about the total or partial inapplicability of the categories to the analysis and understanding of its contingency. One is talking about the displacement of knowledge, of power, of education and practices outside the margins of modern categorisation. The collapse of modern education and the collapse of modern politics would be inseparable, as long as the modern architectonics of education coincides with the modern architectonics of politics. Any attempt to represent or provide a discursive account of how things stand with knowledge and power today, is exceeded by a facticity that cannot be translated into a general cartography. We are therefore not only talking about the impertinence of the modern code, but rather, about the impertinence of every code. It is a question of the impossibility of a general cartography of the current state of affairs. Hence, we would not be talking about a crisis of concepts in the face of the irruption of a new replacement categorisation, nor of the emergence of one map due to the immersion of another; we would be talking about the crisis of categorisation as such; a crisis that cannot and will not be represented. We are lacking the categories to analyse the occurrence of the crisis of the categories. In

this sense, we are forced to acknowledge that we don't know what happens with education and with politics. We are lacking the knowledge that could orient us in contingency. It is not possible to think about the university present via categories or "categorially", nor is it possible to think the present in general. Kant's gesture in the questions "what is enlightenment?" what is the present?, would no longer be possible., We are now categorially indifferent to everything that concerns the university and politics. Although, in fact, we are indifferent to nothing and every gesture regains a profane necessity.

The impossibility of categorially determining the present, on the other hand, does not mean we dwell in absolute laxity. It merely means we do not and cannot know what the present is any longer. That we don't know, that we dwell in categorial indetermination regarding our present, does not mean that the present is not, in fact, complexly determined. And that we ourselves, insofar as we are submerged in that complexity, are not an effect of the material *a priori* that determines us, and which we cannot determine. The weakening of discourse purges us of at least one prejudgement: the assumption that the discursive was exhausted in the categorial. A prejudgement which has prevented the university from thinking what has been repressed and excluded by the efficacy of categorial thought, and from opening itself up to a post-categorial thought.

Reality, as undetermination in each case, moment by moment, millimetre by millimetre, opens itself up to us as politics. It is in facticity, beyond all general frames, that positions acquire the strength, no longer of a transcendent project, but of the immanent event.

Everything speaks the university tongue; nothing speaks "about" the university.

Even if we don't bring it up as a theme, all of us speak about the university insofar as we speak like it. Every object speaks about the university; the university speaks through objects. And who could talk "about" it, if, as it seems, any discourse, any speech of rank and authority, any serious, professional speech, presupposes the university's backing and support? Who or what could speak "about" it with ascendancy, except for the university Itself speaking through its own professionals and its own logic? For a long time now, moreover, it has been considered problematic for something to attempt to account for itself, to explain itself. For how could such an explanation avoid becoming a member of the body it was supposed to be explaining; a member that, in its turn, requires an explanation, and so on?

How then not to speak like the university about the university? How do we preclude ourselves of its style, in order to outstrip it and become theoretically autonomous? And how, if we ever achieved it, could we make ourselves be heard by it? For if anyone were to speak about the university in a language that was not the university's, would he be taken into account? And if he were taken into account, wouldn't he be immediately appropriated by the university, thereby becoming its *medium*, its latest *guru*?

A poetic difficulty of the language of criticism, which risks replacing in what it "says", what it wants to unsay. How, and in what language, could one not speak contextually about context? How, and in what language, could one not speak categorially about university categories? How, and in what language could one read university language? How, and in what language could one not speak university language and still be heard by it? How could one not speak, and be heard? And how could one make oneself be heard without allowing oneself to be assimilated, not even by oneself?

Speaking about the university in a language that was not the university's, the Philosophy Faculty brought it together. (Kant)

Critical distance, the language of that distance, was, as regards the modern university, reserved for the Philosophy Faculty. In Kantian architectonics the Philosophy Faculty interrogatively withdraws from knowledge, established power (government) and dominant public language. It inquires about the "truth" of current institutionality. It thus withdraws from the system of the present.

The university walls remit us to that withdrawal or distance. The collapse of the walls would indicate the end of that distance. In modernity the university walls and barriers would symbolise the division of labour between the university and the present, between discourse and event, between meaning and action. In the Kantian design, the task of philosophy is not to exert a pedagogical influence upon the people under the form of a curricular discipline. The Philosophy faculty is neither educational nor edifying. It cannot be so if its specific business is to question "the secret judgements of common reason", a matter that necessarily exceeds the performative limits of the present. Rather than speaking in and from the instituted possibilities of language, its concern is to search for the conditions of those possibilities. Rather than making itself be heard in language, it wants to make the limits of language audible —the linguistic limits in which the truth and meaning of the professional faculties and of executive power are inscribed. The

linguistic utopia of the Philosophy Faculty is to think power and possibility beyond the limits of executive power; beyond the limits of language, inasmuch as language is the privileged place of the inscription of power, which “forces” rather than “allows” us to speak (Barthes). The Philosophy Faculty’s attempt is only viable at the cost of the impossible: thinking power, powerlessly; speaking about language beyond the limits of language . This impossible feat internally mobilises the modern Philosophy Faculty. Its reflective possibility, therefore, can be determined according to no linguistic canon. It is autonomous. In obedience to the interests of its own autonomy, it exceeds public codes and speech; hence its torsion and incommunicability.

If we call that (no)place or outside of power “esoteric”, then the Philosophy Faculty’s esoteric nature is such, that, as Kant argues, it does not publish even though its writings circulate in the public square. It does not publish because its dialect (ideolecto) can be deciphered or understood neither by the common nor by the royal tongue.

Interrogatively moving about the conditions of possibility of the present, the modern Philosophy Faculty is conceived, by Kant, as a possibility of historical intervention. This is where its strength lies. A strength that, in any case, is neither executive nor constructive, but reflective and critical.

The Kantian inversion of the faculties and their conflict —the Inferior Faculty (philosophy) is placed at the centre of the university, displacing the Superior Faculties (Theology, Law and Medicine)— marks the passage from the medieval university to the modern university —a university that is secularised as criticism of established knowledge and power; as a concern about autonomy, about the history of emancipation, about the historico-transcendental conditions of truth.

Even though the Philosophy Faculty withdraws from the present by questioning the limits of its meaning, it does not withdraw from history. Rather, it gives place to history, from its reading and withdrawal powers.

For us globalisation arrived with “Transition”

Chilean sociology (Flacso, Garretón, Brunner) called the process of redemocratisation of society after the end of the military dictatorship, *transition*. The beginning of transition (from dictatorship to globalised democracy), would, sociologically speaking, “coincide with the last phase of the military regime /.../ it

begins with the 1988 authoritarian plebiscite /.../ and comes to an end with the inauguration of the democratically elected government in December 1989" (M.A. Garretón, 1995). The same can be said about the university's "transition": it starts with the beginning of the end of the military intervention and continues until the full –or fuller– recovery of its autonomy, that is, the neo-heteronomy of the University in the market. The idea that the political and the university transitions begin with the end of the military regime and of delegate rectors, and that they come to an end with fuller democracy, summarises the trivial (sociological) meaning that the term "transition" has among us.

This understanding of the term "transition" coincides with the general way in which twentieth century "transitology" (Claus Offe) approaches the passages to democracy, by mapping an empirical field and establishing transitional typologies which include war situations (the European transitions to democracy after the first world war; the post-fascist transition to democracy in Germany, Italy or Japan); transitions to democracy from military dictatorships without war or with sporadic war situations (Greece, Spain, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay); transitions in the nations of the former eastern bloc (beginning with the USSR's transition, which transitology specifies as a transition to democracy where there is no historical memory of democracy). Transitology maintains that the origin of the passage to democracy is not democratic; that its starting point is shaped by wars, lost wars, military coups, economic disasters and all kinds of calamities. What sociology calls transition, is therefore not the period of *translatio* from the modern State to the post-State market or globalisation -which for us took place with dictatorships and various kinds of calamities.

For us –and I could not specify where this "us" begins and where it ends– transition names, not the passage from dictatorship to democracy, but the transformation dictatorship brought about; the displacement of the State as centre-subject of national history by the eccentric post-State and post-national market. We can now understand that the military coup was the big bang of globalisation for us. A displacement that, in a broader sense, implies the loss of modern history's articulating categories, i.e.: the State, the people, knowledge, history, autonomy, etc.

Transition annihilates "class struggle", a symbol of modern antagonistic politics crystallised in the State as hegemonic device; it dissolves ideology into marketing, and the public into publicity. The transition of the modern State to the post-State or globalised market, coincides with the definitive collapse of the modern university constituted as the division of labour between the *Superior Faculties* (Kant) or

“instrumental investigation” and the *Inferior Faculty* (Kant) or “fundamental inquiry”. A conflict which was symbolised in modernity by the university wall or barrier that marked the untimely difference that separates the university from the present (or “actualidad”). If the “conflict” or “class struggle” between “physical-technical labour” (*fusis*) and “critical-intellectual labour” (*meta-fusis*) constituted the antagonistic axis of modern history, modern politics and the modern university, the end of that history-politics-university would be realised with the abolition of such a strife. That strife expires with the transition that dictatorship brought about.